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STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
PAUL S. HUDNUT*

INTRODUCTION

State constitutions were originally the only source of protection
against the states' authority. However, as major portions of the Bill of
Rights were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, the United
States Constitution increasingly assumed a dominant role in protecting
individual rights from state actions and the role of state constitutions as
an independent source of constitutional protection became submerged.
State courts either construed state constitutions to be coextensive with
the federal Constitution or ignored the state constitutions altogether.
In the past decade, there has been a dramatic rebirth of state constitutional law. No longer do state courts defer to federal interpretations
of the United States Constitution in construing similar provisions in
their own constitutions; rather, they often give their state constitutions
an independent life, thereby insulating their decisions from United
States Supreme Court review.' Both commentators and judges have
viewed this development favorably. 2 Moreover, the trend appeals to
both liberal and conservative philosophies: liberals see it as a means of
avoiding restrictive interpretations by the Burger Court and expanding
individual rights, while conservatives believe that the reemergence of
state constitutions is healthy for our federal system and reasserts the
3
power of the states in our union.
There are, however, troubling aspects to this development which
* Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; J.D., University of Virginia (1984); B.A., Colorado College (1980). The author would like to thank James C.T.
Linfield, Esq., for his helpful comments on an early draft of this article.
1. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). affid, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 NJ. 287, 450
A.2d 925 (1982); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). When based on an
adequate and independent state ground, a case which also decides federal questions will
not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983). See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Brennan, State Cons/ittions and the Protection olIndividual Rights. 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and ConsttitionalRights in the Day of the Biirger Court,
62 VA. L.. RE v. 873 (1976): linde, E Plaribus-Costitutional Thenry and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984): Developments in the Law--The In/tepretatioa of State CoistitationalRights, 95
HAV. L. REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the LaoI. In fact, some state

courts have stated that lawyers who fail to raise state constitutional claims are "skating on
the edge of malpractice." Bamberger, Boosting Y'oir Case with Y'our State Constitition, A.B.A.
J., March 1, 1986, at 49 (quoting Oregon Supreme Court justice Hans Linde).
3.

For the liberal view, see Brennan. supra note 2; Rights .ldvocates Shifting Trtics to

i-g/ht Reagan, L.A. DailyJ., Nov. 16. 1984, at 1, col. 6 (American Civil Liberties Union Legal
l)irector states thai [te Union plans to use state courts to protect individual rights in light
of the increasingly conservative federa Ijudiciary). For the conservalive view, see Roberts.
The. Ideqale and Indepeident State Ground: Souie PiaiCal Coasideiatins. 19 LAND & WVTER I..
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have gone largely ignored. Different levels of constitutional protection
in each of the fifty states may create difficult problems for law enforcement officials and an appearance of unfairness where different results
occur in similar situations. The issue of what remedies are available for
violations of recently expanded state constitutional rights has not been
addressed, and the implications for federalism have not been fully developed. This article surveys the problems caused by the expansion of
state constitutional protections beyond the protections of corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution, and suggests that due
consideration of these problems should lead state courts to be cautious
in expanding constitutional rights beyond those rights provided by the
federal Constitution. The article then discusses the role of state constitutional protections in the federal system and proposes a framework for
deciding when state courts should broaden constitutional protections
4
under state constitutions.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AS SOURCES OF
PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

A.

The Historical Context

In the early days of the American Republic, only state constitutions,
and the rights guaranteed thereunder, protected citizens from actions by
state governments. 5 These state constitutional rights preceded the federal Constitution and the framers of the United States Constitution considered such rights to be so complete that a federal "Bill of Rights" was
not added until several years after the Constitutional Convention of
1787. 6 The federal Bill of Rights was based on provisions of earlier
state constitutions and limited only the powers of the new federal
7
government.
A gradual evolution of constitutional protections, however, began
with the ratification of the fourteenth amendment following the Civil
War. Although initial United States Supreme Court interpretations indicated a narrow application for the new amendment,8 the fourteenth
amendment was subsequently found to incorporate substantially all of
the federal Bill of Rights, thus making these protections applicable to
REv. 647 (1984) (discussing the importance of adequate and independent state grounds as
rules of decision).
4. This article does not attempt to be an exhaustive study of state court decisions
which diverge from federal constitutional interpretation. For such a discussion. see Howard, supra note 2; Developments in the Law, supra note 2.
5. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). This
view of the respective roles of the federal and state constitutions remained for many years
following the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.. Adamson v. California.
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. Ncw Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
6. See Develonnents in the Law, supra note 2. at 1327.
7. Id. at 1326-29. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112.
119 Cal. Rptr. 315. 329 (1975).
8.
lurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); The Slaughtcr-loose Cases. 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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the states.!' As these federal rights were being gradually incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment, they were concurrently being defined
by the United States Supreme Court.10 From the decision in United States
v. Gitlow II through the years of the Warren Court, the protections of the
first, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments were not only expanded
to encompass the actions of state governments, but were expanded to
12
provide greater substantive rights as well.
As federal constitutional rights were expanded and made applicable
to the states, state constitutional protections fell into disuse. This may
be attributed to several factors. First, because incorporated federal
rights became a constitutional "minimum" for states and were often
more expansive than existing state constitutional rights, state courts
were unlikely to provide even broader protections so soon after the ex3
pansion of substantive rights available under the federal Constitution. 1
The liberality of the Supreme Court in comparison with its state counterparts may also have been a factor because many state courts may have
viewed the federal "minimum" as granting too much protection. Finally, with the expansion of federal rights, the attention of litigants,
commentators and law schools was on the federal Constitution, and
state constitutions were viewed as redundant sources of constitutional
protection. 14 As a result of these factors, state constitutional rights were
overshadowed by federal constitutional rights and, on the rare occasions
when state rights were considered, they were held to be coextensive with
the federal guarantees.15
In the last decade, however, state constitutions have reemerged as
important sources of individual protections. As the Burger Court has
embarked on a more conservative path than its immediate predecessors,
litigants and judges have begun to look at state constitutions as sources
of more expansive rights than those available under the federal Bill of
Rights.
9. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating fourth amendment
protections); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating first amendment
protections).
10. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 493-95.

II. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. One commentator has suggested that "[diuring the activist Warren vears. it was
easy for state courts . . . to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal
constitutional law." Howard, supra note 2, at 878. It should not be surprising from all
institutional view that state constitutions were largely ignored. Due to the supremacy
clause, state constitutions can only expand on those rights guaranteed by incorporated
federal constitutional rights. See iof'a note 15. Thus, when the court which defines federal
rights is more activist or liberal than its state counterparts. state constitutions are likely to
be ignored because the federal right will be defined more broadly than the state courts
would be willing to go with state rights. Conversely, when the court defining federal rights
is more conservative than some of its state counterparts, state constitutions become more

important, as federal rights are viewed as being "too narrow.14. See Linde, supra note 2, at 166, 174.
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 260 n.2, 312 A.2d 29. 31 n.2
(1973) ("Our discussion of the Fourth Amendment is equally applicable to the state constitutional provision."), re't. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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Adequate and Independent State Grounds and the Supremacy Clause:
Federal Constraints on State Constitutional Interpretation

The degree to which state courts may interpret state constitutions
differently from federal constitutional precedent is governed by the interaction of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine and
the supremacy clause. Under the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds, state court decisions which rest upon an adequate state
16
ground will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
The supremacy clause,1 7 however, limits the use of this doctrine because
state law may not conflict with federal law. Thus, if state constitutional
rights fall below the federal constitutional protections incorporated in
the fourteenth amendment, they will be preempted by the supremacy
clause.' 8 As a result of this interplay between the doctrine of adequate
and independent state grounds and the supremacy clause, state constitutional interpretation is skewed: state provisions may only be interpreted
to provide broader protections than similar provisions of the United
States Constitution.
The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds is a constitutional limit on the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction: the
Court has no jurisdiction to review a state decision which is adequately
based on state grounds. 19 This doctrine primarily serves federalism
concerns because it expressly recognizes the separation of federal and
state law and prevents federal courts from determining matters of state
law solely because a federal issue is also present. 20 As a result of this
doctrine, state decisions which extend protections beyond those provided by the federal Constitution will be respected by the federal courts
and will not be subject to review even if the case also raises federal con16. The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine had its origins in Murdock
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). A recent articulation of the doctrine
may be found in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
17. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. Under the supremacy clause, state laws may not conflict with the federal Constitution. Thus, federal law sets a constitutional minimum below which a state law may not fall.
However, state courts may expand rights under state constitutions beyond the federal constitutional minimum, as long as one's state constitutional rights do not infringe upon another's federal constitutional rights. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980).
19. If adequate and independent state grounds exist, there is no case or controversy
as to any federal question and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. It has been settled since Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 616
(1875) that the United States Supreme Court will not review decisions of state law bv state
courts, although the basis for that holding was the Court's interpretation of TheJudiciary
Act of 1789 and not the Constitution. See Developments in the Law, stqpa note 2, at 1332-33.
20. Note, however, that federal district courts determine state law issues regularly
under diversity and pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 383 U.S.
715 (1966) (state claim decided by federal court under pendent jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982) (diversity jurisdiction statute).
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stitutional issues.2In addition to requiring that states, at a minimum, provide protections at least equal to federal constitutional requirements, the
supremacy clause has two other effects on state constitutional interpretation. First, expansive state constitutional interpretations may not interfere with the exercise of federal constitutional rights. 2 2 Second,
additional state constitutional protections presumably will not apply to
federal entities.2 3 Thus, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would not
be bound by stricter state search and seizure requirements than those
required by the United States Constitution.
The interplay between the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds and the supremacy clause defines the universe in which
state courts are free to interpret their state constitutions. The doctrine
of adequate and independent state grounds ensures that federal courts
will not interfere with the state courts' freedom to establish state law,
while the supremacy clause ensures that the state courts will not inter21. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). This case clarified the test for determining whether a state court decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds. In
Long, the Court reviewed a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which had reversed
the conviction of the defendant on the grounds that certain evidence had been illegally
seized. People v. Long, 419 Mich. 636, 359 N.W.2d 194 (1984). The state decision cited
the Michigan Constitution and federal case law, but it was unclear upon which ground the
decision rested.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the United States Supreme Court's majority, rejected
the contention that the decision below rested on state law and used the occasion to set out
principles for determining when a state's decisional ground was adequate and independent. The Court stated that
when ...a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
463 U.S. at 1040-41. To avoid the presumption that the decision rests on federal grounds,
the state court "need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that
the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves
compel the result that the court has reached." Id. The Court then restated the traditional
doctrine that "[ijf the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that itis alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will
not undertake to review the decision." Id.
For examples of "plain statements" by state courts, see State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260.
689 P.2d 519, 524 (1984) ("The holding with respect to the Arizona Constitution is based
upon our own constitutional provision, its specific wording, and our own cases, independent of federal authority."); People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 217 (Colo. 1984) (earlier
decisions diverging from federal precedent "rest solely and explicitly" on the state
constitution).
22. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899. 592 P.2d 34 1, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
23. The federal courts have yet to face the issue of whether stricter state constitutional
rules will apply to federal agencies. In other areas, however, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the states may not regulate federal agencies so as to interfere with
federal programs or policies. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 402 (1963) (state
maintains control over patent practices except to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of federal objectives); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) ("the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation bv any' state"). It is likely.
therefore, that a similar supremacy clause analysis would be applied to more exacting state
constitutional rules.
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2 4
fere with the exercise of an individual's rights under federal law.
Under this framework, state courts enjoy great freedom to interpret
their constitutions as they wish, and they have been using this freedom
with increased frequency. 25 In many areas of constitutional law, most
notably criminal procedure and freedom of expression, states have recently provided more expansive rights under state constitutions. 2 1

II.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY STATE COURT DIVERGENCE FROM FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT

The trend toward increased reliance on state constitutions has been
largely applauded. 27 However, when state courts differ from federal
constitutional precedent, several problems may result. This section analyzes the problems which may occur when federal and state constitutional interpretations differ. Section III then proposes a framework for
determining when it is most appropriate for state courts to hold that
24. In addition to the supremacy clause, there are important political checks on state
courts. State initiatives allow voters to overrule unpopular constitutional interpretations.
See CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ 27 (1879, amended 1972) (an initiative by the people of California
which amended the state constitution to overrule People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) and reinstated capital punishment). Compare District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d
1274 (1980) (declaring capital punishment statute unconstitutional) with MASS. CONST.
Part 1, art. 26 (1780, amended 1982) ("No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be
construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death."). Moreover, it is
often less difficult for legislatures to amend state constitutions than it is for Congress to
amend the federal Constitution. Howard, supra note 2, at 939. It should also be noted that
in many states, judges are elected or subject to "approval" votes. Developments in the Low,
supra note 2, at 1351.
Such political checks, however, may not always be an effective limit on activist state
courts. See Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship Between State and Federal Courts:
A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1118, 1126-28 (1984) (discussing the
possibility of an "unreviewable state judgment" where a state court's reliance on both
federal and state constitutions results in "uncertainty about the accuracy of the state
supreme court's interpretation of federal law . .. [which] may deter state constitutional
amendment"). It should also be noted that the amendment process for state constitutions
is burdensome and that it would be difficult to utilize that process every time a state court
made an expansive definition of constitutional rights under the state constitution.
25. According to one commentator, every state has now utilized its constitution to
expand protections beyond those provided by the United States Constitution. Roberts,
supra note 3, at 648.
26. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979) (rejecting United States Supreme Court's holding in Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) that there was no right under the first amendment to solicit
signatures for political petitions at private shopping centers), af1d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (rejecting
United States Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) that a
statement obtained in violation of an individual's Miranda rights was admissible for impeachment purposes); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (rejecting United
States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) that pen registers do not violate a person's fourth amendment rights); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l,
Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (same holding as Robins); State v.Oppermain.
247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (holding that an inventory search held to be permissible
under the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court violated the South Dakota constitution).
27. See supra notes 2-3.
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state constitutional provisions provide greater protections than their
federal counterparts.
A.

Uniformity

The United States Supreme Court has often stressed the desirability
of uniform interpretations of federal law. 28 Uniformity between state
and federal constitutional interpretations is also desirable, unless there
are valid reasons for differences. To assert that uniformity between
state and federal law is desirable is somewhat novel. The conventional
wisdom was perhaps best expressed by Justice Brandeis when he stated:
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.'29 While this may well be true in many areas of law, it is not
necessarily true in the area of constitutional law. 30 There are several
arguments for uniformity of state and federal constitutional law. First,
there is the possibility of different results in similar cases. Although this
is often the case among various jurisdictions with regard to common and
28. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); see also Schlueter,Judicial
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1079, 1099 (1984).
29. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This statement is often cited in support of state court experimentation. See, e.g.,
Howard, supra note 2, at 940 ("While [Justice Brandeis] had in mind experimentation by
legislatures, the same reasoning supports innovation and diversity among state courts.");
see also California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073 n.7 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[s]ome conflict among state courts on novel questions . . . is desirable as a means of
exploring and refining alternative approaches to the problem"). This author is not as
certain as Professor Howard orJustice Stevens that such is the case. As Professor Howard
notes in his article, judges are not subject to the same majoritarian political checks as
legislators. Howard, supra note 2, at 941. Moreover, Justice Brandeis addressed "social
and economic" experiments, not constitutional experiments regarding the relationship between individual liberty and state actions. As argued throughout this article, constitutional
experimentation should be undertaken carefully and with restraint. Finally, Justice Brandeis' statement assumes that such experiments will be "without risk to the rest of the country." As discussed later in this article, some state constitutional rights may have effects
outside state boundaries because they either conflict with other states' constitutional rights
or impede law enforcement. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
30. Some state courts have been responsive to the need for uniformity between state
and federal constitutional protections. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519
(1984) where the court noted:
It is poorjudicial policy for rules governing the suppression of evidence to differ
depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers.
Therefore even though on occasion we may not agree with the parameters of the
exclusionary rule as defined by the United States Supreme Court, we propose, so
long as possible, to keep the Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal.
Id. at 528.
Some members of the United States Supreme Court have also indicated that uniformity between state and federal constitutional law is desirable. See Colorado v. Nunez, 465
U.S. 324 (1984) (where three Justices concurred in dismissing certiorari, but wrote a separate opinion stating that the result reached by the state court was not the result required
by federal law). One commentary has indicated that Nnez is a signal that certain members
of the Court may become more active in disregarding purported adequate and independent state grottnds where it appears that these grounds are "a mere guise to avoid federal
precedent." Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the US. Supreme Court Relating to the
Crimiual Law'Field 1983-84, 13 Cot.o. LAw. 1561, 1617 (1984).
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statutory law, such varying results appear more repugnant or unfair in
the constitutional area, especially in the criminal area. 3 ' A second related argument is that bright lines are needed in constitutional law because it is this law which protects individual liberties from government
interference. Thus, where state and federal constitutional laws differ,
individuthere will be less certainty as to which laws apply to whom and
3
als will be less certain of the consequences of their actions.. 2
As discussed, state constitutional law is skewed by the supremacy
clause: states may only expand on individual rights; they may not contract on those rights which are guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
Therefore, a lack of uniformity will only occur when state constitutions
offer more protection than offered by the federal Constitution. Justice
Brennan argues that such "double protection" of individual liberties is a
beneficial product of federalism, 3 3 but it is troubling that such double
protection will result in different constitutional rights for citizens of different states. 34 For instance, assume state X has held, in accord with the
United States Supreme Court, that a warrantless inventory search of an
automobile by police is a reasonable search and seizure under the state
constitution. In addition, state X has a capital punishment statute. A
neighboring state, Y, has declined to follow such a federal rule and has
held capital punishment to violate state constitutional prohibitions of
cruel and unusual punishment. Assume that identical crimes were committed in both states, and in both cases, the murder weapon was found
during an inventory search of a car. In such a situation, it is entirely
possible that the defendant in state X would be executed while the defendant in state 17 would be set free. This is not to say that different
states would always reach the same results in similar cases if constitutional rules were uniform, but it points to the increased disparity that
will result if state courts diverge from federal constitutional precedent.
Moreover, such disparity will reinforce the popular perception of the
legal system being capricious, hyper-technical, and unfair. To many,
consistency is viewed as a virtue in the law. Having the interpretation of
odds
one's constitutional rights depend on which state one is in is at
35
with this popular conception of immutable constitutional rights.
See infratext accompanying notes 33-35.
32. The uncertainty affects both police and prosecutors who would prefer brighter
lines in the criminal procedure area and protestors who would prefer brighter lines in the
area of first amendment rights so that they may avoid criminal sanctions.
33. Brennan, supra note 2, at 503.
34. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982) ("Divergent interpretations are unsatisfactory from the public perspective, particularly where the historical
roots and purposes of the federal and state provisions are the same."): Lipson, Serrano v.
Priest, I and II: The Continning Role of the California Supreme Court in DecidingQuestions .rising
Under the California Constitution, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 697, 721 (1976) ("In an age of ever increasing technology and mobility, the American people may find it 'curiouser and ciriouser' that conceptions of their fundamental rights should change dramatically when they
merely cross a state line.").
35. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982) ("JEInforcement of
criminal laws in federal and state courts, sometimes involving identical episodes, encourages application of uniform rules governing search and seizure. Divergent interpretations
are unsatisfactory from the public perspective .... ); seealso Lipson, supra note 34. At ihe
31.
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A second argument for uniformity is that uncertainty will result
where state and federal interpretations of constitutional protections differ. Prosecutors and police need to know the rules of the game. More
expansive state protections will not apply to federal agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug Enforcement Agency. 6 As
stated by one Oregon Supreme Court justice: "Federal and state law
officers frequently work together and in many instances do not know
whether their efforts will result in a federal or a state prosecution or
'':
both. In these instances, two different rules would cause confusion. 7
Moreover, regional law enforcement projects, such as drug investigations, could become much more difficult if search and seizure rules, confession rules, and other rules of criminal procedure vary in each of the
states.38

B.

Remedies

Another problem created by state court divergence from federal
constitutional law is one of remedies. Section 1983 of the United States
Code is unique to federal law; there are no state counterparts.3: 9 Thus,
where the state court finds broader protection under a state constitution, the right may be in many cases only an illusory one. For example,
Massachusetts recently found a constitutionally protected liberty interest for a non-institutionalized mentally incompetent person to refuse
theoretical level, justice may be getting the "right result," but many equate justice with
achieving similar results under similar situations. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978); Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural
and DistributiveJustice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979).
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 346, 667 P.2d 996, 1005 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 184-85, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974)).
As an example, Massachusetts recently decided to retain the Aguillar/Spinelli test for
probable cause, a test which was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548
(1985). Thus, in Massachusetts, there is "state probable cause" and "federal probable
cause." When an anonymous informant notifies law enforcement officers of facts which
indicate that an individual is violating both federal and state law, a situation may ensue
where a warrant based on the informant's statement would be supported by "federal"
probable cause but not "state" probable cause. Confusion and inefficiency may well
result.
38. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Reviewi, under the Calif,'nia Constittion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 975. 994-95 (1979).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who. under color... (state law) subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 is the primary method of recovering damages for the violation of federal
rights by state and local officials, and such cases are being filed with increasing frequency.
In 1960, approximately 300 civil rights actions were filed. J. COOK &J,. SOBIESKi. CIVI.
RIGHTS ACTIONS § 1.33 at 1-485, n.36 (1984). In 1984, over 21,000 civil righis actions
were filed, plus an additional 18,800 prisoner petitions alleging civil rights violations. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1984 ANNUAl. REPORT OF TE
)IRECTOR 254, table C2. These 39,000 cases constitute roughly 15 percent of the federal district
court caseload of 261,000 cases. Id. at 253, table C2.
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treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. 4 0 If state employees violate this
state created right, assuming there is no parallel federally protected
right, 4 1 what is plaintiffs remedy? At equity, the individual could obtain
an injunction against future injections. But can the individual recover
damages? Perhaps tort law would provide a remedy, but such action
may be barred by sovereign immunity or other limitations. 4 2 In all likelihood, to adequately protect the right it has created, a state court would
have to imply a remedy4 3 or be satisfied at having created a right without
a remedy. Although there are remedies for constitutional violations
other than damages, 44 proponents of state court divergence should not
ignore the tremendous number of § 1983 damage actions used to remedy violations of federal constitutional rights. 4 5 Without a damages
remedy for those instances in which state officials have violated state
constitutional guarantees, such guarantees are without substance for
many litigants.
The propriety of implying remedies from state constitutions is also
questionable. Implied remedies, from either federal or state constitutions, have none of of the limitations which have been developed in
§ 1983 actions. 4 6 Thus, divergence from federal constitutional precedent will involve another cost: developing a body of jurisprudence on
the limits of implied remedies under state constitutions. Moreover, implied remedies place a court in a quasi-legislative role; certainly, the argument can be made that the issues of remedies should be left to state
47
legislatures.
The final concerns about remedies relate to criminal proceedings.
When a state has adopted broader constitutional protections, what happens when there is a federal criminal proceeding in which the defendant
believes he faces irreparable injury and that his state rights are endan40. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
41. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), remanded sub nom., Rogers v. Okin, 738
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
42. In the hypothetical case discussed, a plaintiff might sue the state in tort for battery. In some states, though perhaps not Massachusetts, the suit may be barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed.
1984). Moreover, both the elements and defenses which must be proven will be different.
In battery, a plaintiff must show offensive contact with his person by the defendant, id.§ 9
at 39, while the gravamen of a constitutional complaint would be that the plaintiFs constitutional rights, not his person, had been violated by state officials. See State v. Bolt. 142
Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984) (discussing alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule, including damages actions in tort for invasion of privacy or for outrage).
43. Implied constitutional remedies have been found tinder the federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
44. Constitutional violations may be remedied by injunction, see,
e.g., Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), or by exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, see. e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. See supra note 39.
46. For example, are there absolute or qualified immunities to implied cauises of action, as there are in § 1983 actions? Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
47. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text; seealso Deukmejian & Thompson,
su/ra note 38, at 999-1002 (criticizing the California Supreme Court for assuming legislative finctions).
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gered? May a state court grant an injunction against the federal criminal
proceeding under a theory similar to that allowed to defendants in state
proceedings in Younger v. Harris?4 8 Similarly, if a defendant has been
convicted in a federal criminal proceeding, can he file a habeas corpus
petition claiming that he is being imprisoned in violation of his state
constitutional rights? Although the answers to these questions are not
49
entirely clear, it is likely that these actions would be barred.
C.

Federalism

Some advocates of state court divergence feel it is a healthy aspect
of federalism and a revitalizing trend for the states'judiciaries. 50 While
it is true that the reassertion of a state's independence is healthy, these
advocates ignore some potentially damaging aspects of divergence on
the federal system.
Most damaging is the adverse effect that unprincipled state court
decisions have on federalism. Too often the adoption of a different rule
under the state constitution is inspired by disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. 5 '
When a state court diverges from federal constitutional precedent solely
because of a political or policy disagreement with the United States
Supreme Court, it weakens the federal system. It signals a lack of respect by state court judges for precedent and the United States Supreme
Court, and appears unseemly, result-oriented, and unprincipled. 52
48. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that
an injunction against pending state criminal proceedings would not be issued absent evidence of bad faith prosecution against the defendant. Where, however, state proceedings
have not been brought, but an individual legitimately feels threatened by a criminal proceeding to the extent that he can allege he will suffer irreparable injury, he may seek injunctive relief in federal court. Id. at 48.
49. It is unlikely that a state court could enjoin a federal criminal proceeding. See
General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,
413 (1964) (a civil case which held that "state courts are completely without power to
restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions . . ."). As to the habeas corpus
petition, it would be unlikely to succeed, as it is likely that such an action would violate the
supremacy clause. See Geneial Atomic, 434 U.S. at 15 (stating that a state court injunction
prohibiting a party from litigating in federal court conflicted with the supremacy clause).
See also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
50. See Brennan. supra note 2: Roberts, supra note 3.
51. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 109, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976) (holding that a decision of the United States Supreme Court was "not
persuasive authority"); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 142 n.6 (Colo. 1983) (where
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that it found a decision of the United States Supreme
Court "unconvincing").
52. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 349, 450 A.2d 952, 963 (1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring) (" 'here is a danger, however, in state courts turning uncritically to their state
constitutions for convenient solutions to problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere. The erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine may be the eventual result of'
such an expedient approach."); Bator, The State Coarts and Federal Conistitutional Riglits, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) ("1 must confess some misgivings about the
extent to which some . . . commentary seems to assume that state constitutional law is

sitnfply 'available' to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed
tnsatislactory."); letikmc jian & Thompson. supra note 38. at 1109 (criticizing California
Supreme Court for being "result-oriented" and noting that such opinions undermine the
har's and the public's confidence in a court's decisions).
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State court activism has also resulted in similar "unseemly" behavior by
the United States Supreme Court as evidenced by recent decisions of
that tribunal. The Court has been accused of "reaching out" to find
federal grounds for decisions, 5 3 rendering advisory opinions, 54 and refusing to remand cases to state courts. 55 While principled divergence
from federal precedent is a healthy aspect of our federal system, unprincipled divergence undercuts the cooperative aspect of the system. 56 Interpretations of the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court are entitled to respect and deference by the state courts,
and such persuasive authority should not be lightly disregarded.
Moreover, although it is unlikely that there will be a major shift of
constitutional litigation to more "liberal" state courts, it seems that
more of such cases will be brought in such state courts. Thus, state
courts should realize that as they extend constitutional protections, they
will be increasing the demands on their judicial systems.
The emergence of different state constitutional rules will increasingly require federal courts to determine state constitutional law. Litigants in federal court asserting federal constitutional claims will now
also assert claims based on similar state provisions. While such issues
arise under pendent or diversity jurisdiction, 57 and the federal courts
clearly have the jurisdiction to decide them, a strong argument can be
made that federal courts should abstain from making such determina53. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065-72 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring). Apparently,
Justice White's advisory opinion was written so that other courts would not confuse the
Colorado rule and the federal rule on the disclosure of an informant's identity. One commentary has indicated that the opinion signals that the Court may become more active in
disregarding purported adequate and independent state grounds where it appears that
these grounds are "a mere guise to avoid federal precedent." Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the CriminalLaw Field 1983-84, 13 COLO. LAW.
1561, 1617 (1984).
Note also the requirement in Long that an adequate and independent state ground be
"bona fide." 463 U.S. at 1042. Such a requirement may be another means by which the
Supreme Court could control state courts which it thought too "active." Thus, if a state
court diverges from federal precedent for unprincipled policy reasons, the United States
Supreme Court could assert jurisdiction on the ground that the state decision was not
"bona fide." This raises a disturbing spectre of the state court being reversed on state law
because the United States Supreme Court found the decision to be a bad faith effort to
avoid federal precedent. Whether the United States Supreme Court could assert such jurisdiction and whether the state would be bound by the reversal raises issues beyond the
scope of this article.
55. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 651-52. In the past, it was common to remand a state
case to the state court, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 729 (1975) (Marshall,J., dissenting),
but recently the Court has reversed without remand. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). This may be the Court's way of
preventing a state court, upon remand, from reinstating its original holding by substituting state grounds. It is unclear whether this method will avoid such state court responses.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), on remand, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982), the New York Court of Appeals treated such a reversal as a remand,
but held that state law compelled the same result as that reached bv the United States
Supreme Court.
56. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 350. 450 A.2d 952, 964 (1982) (Handlcr. J.. concurring) ("a considerable measure of' cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist
system").
57. See supra note 20.
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that "absten-

tion is not required for interpretation of

.

.

. state constitutional

provisions" which "parallel" the federal Constitution. 5 9 However,
where state courts have previously diverged from federal precedent in
interpreting state constitutional provisions, abstention may be proper,
as interpretation of the state constitution would avoid the necessity of
reaching a federal constitutional issue. 60 Thus, when a federal court is
presented with claims that a litigant's state and federal constitutional
rights have been violated, it would be a proper exercise of discretion to
abstain from deciding the case when the state claim is based on a constitutional provision which has been subject to a different interpretation
than a similar federal provision. 6 I Thus, a side effect of divergent state
court decisions may be to deny litigants a federal forum unless they are
willing to sacrifice or delay their state law claims. 62 Divergence from
federal precedent, therefore, may increase the caseload of the state
courts and result in judicial inefficiency. Both federal and state courts
may need to become involved in a case that a federal court could have
decided entirely on its own were it not for the possibility of a different
interpretation of the state constitution.
58. It should also be noted that even if federal courts choose not to abstain from
deciding state constitutional issues, their power to grant relief for violations of state constitutional rights is limited. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment bars federal
courts from ordering state officials to comply with state law. Thus, injunctive relief for
violation of expanded state constitutional rights may not be provided by federal courts.
See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1984).
59. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 n.4 (1984). In .Midkif,
however, the state constitutional provision, which parallels the fifth amendment "takings
clause," had not been interpreted differently from the fifth amendment. A different case
would present itself if a litigant in Federal District Court for South Dakota raised a constitutional claim under South Dakota's parallel provision to the fourth amendment because
South Dakota has diverged from the federal interpretations of the fourth amendment's
"illegal search and seizure" on several occasions. See, e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976). In such a case, there is an "uncertain question of state law" which may be
"subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" or substantially modify the
federal constitutional question, ,Vidkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2327, thus presenting a proper case
for abstention.
60. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800. 814
(1976).
61. The grotnds for abstention could be either the Pullman type, where an unsettled
question of state law may render the federal constitutional issue unnecessary, Railroad
Conini'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), or the "comity" type. where a state
constitutional law is a "mailer ... largely of local concern and which [is within the special
competence of local courts." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1245 v. Public
Scrv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 212 n.l (9th Cir. 1980). See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1982).
62. If the case is seni to state court, the litigants will eventually get a federal hearing
on an asserted federal claim once they have exhausted state appeals and applied for ceriiorari to the United States Supreme Court. There may be other reasons for preferring federal court, however, such as certain rles of procedttre or evidence or the convenience of
the parties. Abstention in such cases would certainly Undercut pendent and diversity jurisdiclion. as litigants would lie forced to abandon state claims in order to slay in federal
court, or would lie forced to abandon federal court to maintain their state clains.
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InstitutionalAccountability

Another disturbing aspect of state divergence is a danger which affects the federal bench as well: judicial review is often a countermajoritarian exercise. This problem is aggravated when state constitutions are interpreted to provide broader protections than those afforded
by the federal Constitution. Decisions in which state courts strike down
legislative acts which satisfy federal constitutional requirements should
not be undertaken lightly. 63 Although there may be more political
checks on state judges than on their federal counterparts, 64 state judges
would do well to remember that "judicial review ... is never without an
anti-democratic flavor."'6 5 The line between judicial functions and legislative functions is a thin one, and activist state courts must avoid stepping into the legislature's shoes. 6 6 Divergence, therefore, should be
limited to occasions when there are principled reasons for extending
further constitutional protections, for, as pointed out by one commentator, "[p]ossessed of neither the purse nor the sword, the power and influence of ... [a] Court are in direct proportion to the respect which its
67
decisions command."
III.

DECIDING WHEN TO DIVERGE:

A

DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR

STATE COURTS

The purpose of this article is not to argue that state courts should
not interpret state constitutions as providing broader rights than those
provided under the federal Constitution; rather, it is to point out the
problems caused by such divergence. The author does not believe that
the problems outlined above, either by themselves or taken together,
compel the conclusion that state courts should never diverge. Rather,
such problems lead to the conclusion that the independent interpretation of state constitutions is not a path without certain costs, and that
such costs, when considered carefully, counsel against it becoming a
common practice of state courts.
When should a state court diverge from federal constitutional precedent when interpreting similar state constitutional provisions? This
section first discusses the role of state constitutions in protecting indi63. A court which the public believes has become too active may be reined in by political checks. See supra note 24 for examples. In Florida, an initiative was passed providing
that the search and seizure clause of the state constitution "shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1968, amended 1982). After the
California Supreme Court found that capital punishment violated the state constitution,
the California voters enacted by initiative a constitutional amendment declaring that the
"'death penalty . . . shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or
unusual punishment . . . nor . . . be deemed to contravene any other provision of this

constitution.- CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1879, amended 1972).
64.

See supra notes 24, 63; see also Bator, suJ)r note 52, at 623-25: Neubornc. The M1Iyth

,/Parvty, 90

HAv. I.. REv. 1105 (1977).
65. Howard, supra note 2. at 941.
66. Deukmejian & Thompson. suira note 38. at 999-1006.
67. Bite, 'ladeyon apid the .ldequale State Grotwd, 45 S. (CAI,, I.. REV. 750. 758 (1972).
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vidual liberties. It then discusses several factors which should be considered by state courts in deciding whether to expand individual
protections under the state constitution beyond those granted by the
federal Constitution.6 8
A.

The Role of State ConstitutionalProtections in the Federal System

One premise of this article is that the role of the United States
Supreme Court is to protect the fundamental civil liberties guaranteed
by the federal Constitution. The role of the state courts in constitutional jurisprudence, therefore, is to determine when to provide greater
protection under the state constitution than is available under the federal Constitution.
In determining the respective roles of federal and state constitutional rights, it is necessary to begin with the recognition that, in some
instances, state bills of rights preceded the federal Bill of Rights, and
that federal constitutional protections did not apply to actions by the
states until their incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. 6 9 Since
such incorporation, however, it is apparent that the federal Constitution
has emerged as the primary source of fundamental constitutional
rights. 70 Although some commentators hark back to the classical model
of state primacy, the better view is to treat the role of state constitutional
protections as a supplemental one. 7 1 Such a "supplemental" view re68. The discussion below assumes that the federal constitutional issue in question has
been decided by the United States Supreme Court. When the scope of federal protection
has not been so decided and instead there is federal precedent only from federal appellate
and district courts, or perhaps no federal precedent, the problem of divergence is not as
great. First, there is often no settled federal law from which to diverge. Second, in such a
case, the state court may decide the case on the federal issue. Third, where there is federal
law on point, it is often split. The state court could decide to adopt one rule or the other
as its own rule. In short, there is not the problem of disrespect, lack of uniformity (which
may also exist in the federal caselaw) or unprincipled divergence.
69. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr.
325, 329 (1975):
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart.
The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
Id. at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See also Right to Choose v. Byrne. 91
N.J. 287. 293, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982); Linde, supra note 2, at 174 ("[T]he federal Bill of
Rights was drawn from the earlier state declarations of rights adopted at the time of independence... land] most protection of people's rights against their own states entered the
federai Constitution only in the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860's ..
) Developments in the Law, supa note 2, at 1326-29. Cf State v. Bolt. 689 P.2d 519, 523 (Ariz. 1984)
(stating that "Arizona's constitutional provisions generally were intended to incorporate
the federal protections").
70. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 293, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982); Pollock.
State Conslitutions as Separate Sources of Fundanimenlal Rights, 35 RtrGERS L. R.v. 707, 718
(1983); see also Neuborne, The .1y"th of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (1977) (arguing that the political insulation of federal courts renders them better able to protect individual liberties against majoritarian pressures).
71. Advocates of the "primacy" approach argue that the state constitution is an cntirely separaie source of cons tit utional protection and that, therelire, the state cou't is
hligated to decide a constitutional issue first under its own constitution before reaching
the federal constitutional issue. Linde, supra note 2. at 178-79: Welsh, supra note 24, at
I125: Note. The .\Ne Federalisn: 7iiu,arid a Iincipled Ialeqtneta/ion of the State Constiition. 29
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flects the realty of federal constitutional protections and the supremacy
of such protections.7 2 Once it is accepted that state constitutional protections will serve as supplements to federal constitutional protections,
the issue becomes one of when these state protections should be extended. Although the state courts possess the power to diverge whenever they desire, problems of uniformity, remedies, and federalism
counsel against frequent exercise of this power. This article proposes a
conservative approach for such divergence, based on the national or local character of the right in issue, and whether it is a matter of extending
protection beyond that provided under the federal Constitution or
maintaining a protection in the face of a contraction of the federal
protection.
When a state constitutional right does not interfere with federal interests and concerns activities that do not have substantial effects beyond state boundaries, it can be considered a "local" right. In contrast,
a right is "national" in character when it is either intertwined with federal laws and policies which would be disrupted by separate state rules,
or when it will have substantial effects beyond state boundaries. Divergent interpretation by state courts of local rights may involve fewer costs
than those which result when the right is national. State courts are often
better equipped to determine the need for additional constitutional protections in local situations. Moreover, because the exercise of such
rights would have minimal impacts outside the state, there is less of a
need for uniformity. Where a national right is involved, state court divergence is more difficult to justify. Uniformity is important in these
national areas, and direct conflicts between state and federal laws should
be avoided. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court is better able
to balance national concerns when determining the scope of these rights
because a state court's views are more provincial.
An example of a national right is provided by the cases of People v.
L. REV. 297, 317 (1977); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-91
(1984) (Stevens,J., concurring); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 346-48, 450 A.2d 952, 960-62
(Pashman, J., concurring). One problem with the primacy approach is that no matter how
true such a model is to constitutional history, see Welsh, supra note 24, at 1132-41, it is of
questionable value in describing the role of state constitutions in the current federal system. As noted by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the primacy model
"downplays the realty of the dominant role of the federal Constitution." Pollock, supra
note 70, at 718; see also Developments i the Law, supra note 2, at 1356-59 (proposing an
"interstitial approach"). This "dominant role" results from the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, and from the supremacy clause which prohibits
state laws from conflicting with the federal Constitution. The net result is that state constitutional protections are relegated to a "supplemental" role. State constitutional protecSTAN.

tions are only meaningful if they go bevond federal protections, for ifthey fall below the

federal protections, they are of minimal practical significance as they will be preempted by
federal protections by operation of the supremacy clause. Bit see Massachusetts v. Upton,
104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens sees the relative roles of
federal and state constitutions in a different light; to him, state constitutions are the "primary guardian'" of individual liberty, while the federal Constitution is the "ultimate guardian of individual rights." 1d. at 2091.
72. Federal constitutional protections are more complete because state protections do
not constrain the federal government. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Sporleder 73 and People v. Timmons, 74 in which the Colorado Supreme
Court decided not to follow Smith v. Maylands 75 and held that pen registers 76 infringed upon individual expectations of privacy protected by the
Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court based its holdings on the state constitution because it found the United State Supreme
Court's holding in Smith to be "unconvincing." ' 77 In neither opinion did
the Colorado Supreme Court address the extent to which federal law
was involved. As noted by Justice Erickson in his dissent in Timmons,
"the area of electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping has been the subject of pervasive federal legislation." '7 8 Moreover, it is an area of national concern because it implicates an individual's privacy interest in
telephone calls that go beyond state lines. Thus, Colorado's constitutional protection may conflict with other states which follow the holding
in Smith. 79 For instance, assume that X places a call from Denver to Y in
New York to order illegal narcotics. Presumably, a pen register record
of the call would not be admissible in a prosecution against X in Colorado. But, assuming New York does not extend state protections beyond Smith, may New York use the record as evidence if it prosecutes X
and Y? As telephone communication is the most common method of
interstate communication, it would be desirable to have uniform rules
for the use of pen registers so that both federal and state law enforcement officer will be able to monitor interstate criminal activity. It is in
such areas that state courts should be most hesitant to diverge from federal precedent, yet the Colorado Supreme Court did so without considering these issues.
An example of local law is illustrated by the "shopping center"
cases which considered the constitutional rights of those who wish to
collect signatures for political petitions on private property. In 1979,
the California Supreme Court departed from federal constitutional precedent 8° and held that the California Constitution "protect[s] speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the centers are privately owned." 8 1 The United States Supreme Court
73. 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (installation of pen register must be preceded by
search warrant because it is a search and seizure under Colorado Constitution).
74. 690 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1984) (applied rule in Sporleder).
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no search warrant required when installing a pen register
because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed).
76. "A pen register records the numbers dialed from a particular telephone and
counts the numbers of incoming calls. It does not record or monitor conversations." Timinons, 690 P.2d at 214, n.I.
77. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 143 n.6. Cf State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982)
(reaching a holding similar to Sporleder but basing it on a difference in language between
constitutional provisions and preexisting state law).
78. People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 218 (Colo. 1984) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting)
(citing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1982), which regulates the interception of certain wire and oral coinmmunications by both
federal and state officials).
79. See .rnpra
note 75.
80. E.!., Hudgens v. NIIRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (employees did not have firs( amendmcnt right to picket in frount
of their employer's leased store in a shopping center).
81. Robins %. Pruneyard Shopping Center. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347.
153 Cal. Rpir. 854, 860 (1979), afd 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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affirmed this decision, holding that the exercise of such a state constitutional right did not infringe on the shopping center owners' federal first
amendment rights or their federal protection from a taking of property
without just compensation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 2 Other states have followed the California Supreme Court's
ruling and found constitutionally protected rights to speak and petition
on privately owned property. 8 3 The issue of whether there is a constitutional right to speak, petition, or assemble on private property such as
shopping centers does not implicate national concerns. It is largely a
local issue because political elections are conducted by the states, and
state law governs private ownership of property. Thus, when such local
rights are at issue, state court divergence is more appropriate. There
will be a negligible effect beyond the state's boundaries if it adopts such
a right, and the state courts are better suited to weigh the local interests
84
involved.
A second area in which state constitutional protections can play an
important role is when they serve as a "backup" in the event that rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution are dramatically curtailed. The
presence of an alternative source of individual protection provides a
check on severe contractions of federal constitutional rights.8 5 in the
case of such a contraction of federal rights, state constitutions could assume a more important role in delineating individual rights and protecting those rights in which individuals have an expectancy. 8 6 Such a role
82. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
83. E.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983)
(state constitution protects the right to solicit nominating signatures in private shopping
centers in support of political candidate's efforts to be placed on ballot); State v. Schmid,
84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (state constitution protects freedom of speech and assembly on the grounds of a private university), appeal dismissed sub nom., Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
84. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 352, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring) ("When particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a
uniform national policy, they are ripe for decision under state law.").
An influential article, Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1344-45, proposes that
state constitutional law be treated as a "core" area under National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and that therefore, federal intervention in the form of United
States Supreme Court review of state judgments should be limited. The Court, however,
recently overruled NVational League of Cities, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 2041 (1985) where the Court held that
Congress could regulate the states under the commerce clause. Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that in certain areas of law, federal intervention
should be avoided and that the expertise of local courts should be applied. See Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951).
One commentator has suggested that constitutional issues concerning local taxation
and education policies are better suited to state courts. Pollock, supra note 70. at 714-17.
85. It should be noted that state constitutions would not be a complete "backup."
Presumably, the federal government is not subject to state constitutional protections due
to the supremacy clause. See supra notes 18 and 23.
86. See People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981):
A blind following of Supreme Court precedent would frustrate our ability to protect rights enjoyed by Californians and to maintain consistency in California law.
If the United States Supreme Court hands down a decision which limits rights
established by' earlier precedent in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the
earlier opinion, it may become incumbent upon this court to employ the Califownia Constitution to maintain consistent principles protecting those rights.
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should come into play, however, only when dealing with exceptional legislative or executive actions, such as amendment of the Bill of Rights or
congressional limits on, or elimination of, the lower federal courts or

federal remedies. 8*7 It is in such exceptional cases that the state courts
may need to become the primary protectors of both state and federal
s8
constitutional rights.
Thus, as a first step in determining when to diverge from federal
constitutional precedent, a state court should decide whether the right
asserted is local or national in character, or whether it is a right which
has been substantially contracted under federal law and therefore may
be in need of additional state protection. Once a state court determines
that the institutional role of state constitutional protections may justify
more extensive protection of the individual right, several other factors
should be considered before deciding to diverge.
B.

Other Factors Involved in the Decision to Diverge From Federal
Constitutional Precedent

In addition to considering the character of the right asserted and
whether there is a need for state protection due to a contraction of a
parallel federal right, there are other factors a state court should con-

sider before diverging from federal constitutional precedent.
Id. at 94, 634 P.2d at 932-33, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
While the Bustamante opinion is not a model of the judicial restraint advocated by this
article, it does illustrate the expectations of the citizenry in certain constitutional rights. In
the event the Bill of Rights were amended so that it did not protect the right of citizens to
assemble in public forums to express their opinions, the state courts might decide that
such a right exists under their state constitutions, thus protecting the expectations of those
who have become accustomed to this constitutional right.
87. In most cases exceptional circumstances would be limited to legislative or executive action. In some situations, however, contraction of federal constitutional rights by the
United States Supreme Court could also initiate greater state protections. To this author,
the "exceptional circumstances" justification should be used rarely and should not be used
as an excuse to avoid federal precedent with which state court judges disagree for political
reasons. The touchstone should be citizen expectancy, see supra note 86. As an example.
should the United States Supreme Court ever hold that the Miranda warnings are no
longer required by federal law, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985), and
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630-31 (1984) (both cases describe Miranida as a
"prophylactic rule" that is not constitutionally required), state courts might decide that.
due to the widespread belief that citizens have a right to irianda warnings, constitutional
Aliranda-type warnings would still be required under the state constitution.
A distinguishable situation is presented where federal law is uncertain and the United
States Supreme Court has oscillated, such as in the scope of automobile searches incident
to arrest. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BAir. ..
RExv. 379, 394 (1980). In this situation, state courts may decide to base a decision on state
law due to the uncertainty of federal law. See Pollock, supra note 70, at 712. This uncertainty should be a factor for state courts to consider in deciding whether to diverge, but it
should not be dispositive.
88. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 52, at 627 (where, in discussing the state court's roles in
interpreting federal constitutional protections, Bator notes that "litl is the state, and not
the lower federal courts that constitute our ultimate guarantee that a usurping legislature
and executive cannot strip us of our constitutional rights").
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1. Uniformity, Remedies, and Federalism
In deciding whether to diverge, the effects of such divergence
should be considered. Uniformity interests will, of course, be considered in analyzing the local or national character of the right asserted.
But such an interest in uniformity should also be considered in the abstract: is this a right involving an interest in uniformity, or is this a right
in which experimentation in the different states would be beneficial?
Remedies should be considered. If the right could not be adequately
protected by injunction, state courts should hesitate to diverge from federal law because any state damage remedies would need to be implied
by the state court. As with uniformity, federalism concerns will also be
considered in the local/national analysis. But the state court should analyze any further impacts on the workings of the "federal" judicial system, such as whether the right would commonly be asserted in federal
court under diversity or pendent jurisdiction.
2.

Similarity of Language Between State and Federal Provisions
and Legislative History

When the state and federal constitutional provisions are substantially identical, a state court should be more hesitant to diverge from
federal constitutional precedent absent special circumstances. 8 9 Where
special circumstances are present, such as where the legislative history
of the state constitutional provision indicates that the state intended to
offer broader protections than those available under the federal Constitution, state courts should give content to such legislative intent.9 0
Substantial differences in language between the state and federal
provisions also support a finding of more extensive rights under the
89. "Substantially identical" means that the differences in wording are not material.
For example, the Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . ."U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, while the Colorado Constitution provides: "The people shall be secure in
their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place or seize any person or things shall issue without ...probable
cause. . . ." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
There are many instances, however, where material differences in language exist. For
example, while the first amendment to the Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to
CONST. amend. I, the New Jersey
assemble and to petition the Government . . "U.S.

Constitution provides "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects . . " NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 6, and the Massachusetts Constitution provides
"The right of free speech shall not be abridged." MASS. CONST. art. XVI (1780, amended
1948). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments")
with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1879, amended 1974) (forbidding "cruel or unusual punishment"). In People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), the California Supreme Court used this difference in language
to find that capital punishment violated the state constitution.
90. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(where California court analyzed legislative history and difference in language between
state and federal constitutional provisions), cert. demed, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). It should be
noted, however, that there is a paucity of legislative history regarding legislative intent
when differently worded state provisions are enacted.
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state constitution. 9 l For example, in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center,9 2 the California Supreme Court found that the difference in language between federal and state constitutions was dispositive. The
court held that the language of the state constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression 93 was broader than the first amendment and therefore granted broader rights than its federal counterpart.
3.

Special State Factors: Pre-existing Law or Tradition

In some instances, there may be other state law factors which suggest expanding state constitutional protections beyond those provided
by federal law. Several courts have considered the development of state
law in related areas. For example, in Right to Choose v. Byrne, 94 the New
Jersey Supreme Court based its divergence from federal law, in part, on
the greater rights a woman had under state common law. Other courts
have considered less tangible state traditions. The Alaska Supreme
Court protected adults possessing marijuana under the state constitution's guarantee of privacy stating that Alaska "has traditionally been the
home of people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to
. ..[live] here in order to achieve a measure of control over their life95
styles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states."
Pre-existing law and tradition alone, while relevant to the state court's
decision, would seldom rise to the level of importance which would justify divergence from federal law. If, however, other factors are present,
traditions or pre-existing law may support a decision to diverge.
C.

Summary

A state court's decision to expand state constitutional protections
beyond those provided by the federal Constitution should begin with an
analysis of whether there is a role for additional state protection. Such
state protection is most clearly justified when the right asserted is local
in nature or when a similar federal right has been contracted. If such a
right is at issue, a state court should then consider other factors such as
the similarity in language between state and federal provisions, any special state law or traditions, whether special remedies will be required,
and the impact that extending the protection will have on uniformity
and federalism.
Where the state court has decided to diverge from federal prece91. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590
(1983) (broader right of freedom of expression based on difference in language between
state and federal constitutions); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 295, 450 A.2d 925,
933 (1982) (New Jersey Supreme Court diverged from federal constitutional precedent
basing its decision on "more expansive" state constitutional language and pre-existing
state law governing a woman's right "to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to fullterm").
92. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
93. "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on a
subject .... CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2 (1879, amended 1974).
94. 91 N.J. 287, 295, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (1982).
95. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
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dent, it should clearly set forth its reasons for doing so.'! " The proper
approach would be to address the federal issue first and state that fed57
eral law would not protect the right in issue.9
Then the state court
should set out its reasons for differing from federal law and make a
"plain statement" that its holding is based on state law.'-18 Such an approach would make it evident that the right was based on state law and
also make clear what the federally guaranteed minimum protection
would be, thus allowing for valid amendment of the state constitution if
the new rule was unpopular. 99
When a state court decides not to diverge from federal constitutional precedent, the issue arises whether it should rest the decision on
federal law without mentioning state law, or whether it should explicitly
adopt the federal rule as state law. Two considerations are important.
First, if the state court rests its decision on federal grounds, unnecessary
state constitutional adjudication can be avoided.10 0 Moreover, if the de96. State courts have taken several approaches in deciding when to base a decision on
state grounds when a litigant has raised both federal and state constitutional grounds. See
Linde, supra note 2, at 178. One approach is to decide both state and federal grounds in
different parts of the opinion. See State v. Badger. 141 Vt. 430. 450 A.2d 336 (1982). A
different approach, advocated by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court, is to
reach state law only after deciding that the right is not protected by federal law. See Pollock, supra note 70, at 718-20; Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
A third approach, advocated by Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, is to
decide first whether the right is protected under the state constitution. The federal issue
should be decided only if the state constitution does not prohibit the infringement of the
right asserted. See Linde, supra note 2, at 178-79; Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625
P.2d 123, 126 (1981) (stating that "the proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim").
97. See supra note 71. Courts applying the "primacy" approach would not discuss
whether the right was protected by federal law unless they decide that the right was not
protected by state law. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 2, at 178-79. Under the "supplemental"
approach advocated by this article, federal protections should be considered first before a
decision is made to extend state protections beyond those provided under the federal
Constitution.
98. By making a "plain statement" that the decision is based on state law, the state
court will be complying with the rule announced in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), discussed supra at note 21.
99. A common criticism of state court divergence based on an "interstitial" or "supplemental" model is that it creates the possibility of "dual reliance" or "unreviewable"
judgments. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 38, at 996-99; Welsh, supra note
24, at 1126-28. When a state court adopts broader rights explicitly under the state constitution, review by the United States Supreme Court is barred by the doctrine of adequate
and independent state grounds. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. If, at the
same time, the state court alternatively bases its decision on federal law, the state ground
will be more difficult to change by amendment. The uncertainty of the state court's accuracy in its determination of the federal ground makes amendment by the legislature or the
initiative process more difficult. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 38, at 987, 999;
Welsh, supra note 24, at 1127. If, however, the state court only extends protections under
the state constitution when the federal Constitution does not guarantee such a right, the
problem of alternative grounds will be avoided. In many cases, state courts will defer to
federal law, and their decisions will be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. If
a court decides to diverge, such divergence will be expressly based on the state constitution, so that "political" review will be available.
100. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (United States Supreme Court avoids ruling on constitutional
issues when the case may be decided on other grounds); see also In )e Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 944, 569 P.2d 1286, 1300, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 312 (1977) (Clark,J., dissenting) (Cali-
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cision is based alternatively on both federal and state grounds, it may
create an "unreviewable decision." The decision will not be reviewable
by the United States Supreme Court because it rests on adequate and
independent state grounds, and it cannot be changed by state constitutional amendment because it rests on federal constitutional grounds. '
Thus, where both state and federal issues have been presented and the
state court has decided not to diverge from federal precedent, the better
course is to rest the decision on federal grounds, explicitly stating that
the state court has decided not to extend further protection under the
state constitution. Such a decision would be subject to United States
Supreme Court review, but it would also inform citizens that their state
constitutional rights were coextensive with their federal rights. It would
foreclose future reliance based on a belief that state rights might be
broader in a particular area of law and would inform citizens that if they
desire broader rights, such rights would need to be effectuated by constitutional amendment.
CONCLUSION

This article has urged that, for a number of reasons, state courts
should be hesitant to diverge from the constitutional protections provided by the federal Constitution. The discussion has centered on the
issue of when state courts should provide additional protections to their
citizens and has urged that a conservative approach be adopted by state
courts.
State constitutional protections are best viewed as supplemental
sources of protection for individual rights. Reliance on state constitutional provisions generally should be limited to cases in which the right
asserted is local in character or where it is necessary to protect a right in
the face of a substantial contraction of federal constitutional rights. In
such situations, state courts should also examine the costs of divergence
and the effects that such divergence will have on the federal system.
United States Supreme Court Justice Stone once commented that
"the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self
restraint."' 0 2 This statement aptly applies to state courts as well, for
fornia Supreme Court avoids ruling on constitutional issues when the case may be decided
on other grounds). But see Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct, 2085, 2090-91 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring) (stating that by deciding state constitutional questions first, the state
court will avoid deciding an unnecessary federal constitutional question).
101. See discussion supra note 99. In a case where the state court has decided not to
diverge, thejudgment should rest only on federal or state grounds to avoid the problem of
an "'unreviewable judgment." For several reasons, this article takes the position that the
state court should base its judgment on federal grounds when it decides not to diverge
from the federal rule. First, the role of state constitutional protections is supplemental.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, where the state court decides not to extend rights beyond those provided by federal law, the supplemental role of state constitutions is not triggered. Second, state courts have no obligation to decide state questions
before reaching federal law. If they may avoid reaching an issue of state constitutional law
by resting their decision on federal law, they are following the prudential rule against
unnecessary constitutional adjudication. See supra note 100.
102. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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their power to independently interpret state constitutional provisions is
subject to few constraints. Yet, while the power of state courts to interpret their state constitutions as they wish is clear, it is also clear that
divergence from federal constitutional protections is not without cost.
The independent interpretation of state constitutions is protected in the
federal system, but this protection should not be abused. State courts
must act with a "sense of self restraint."

